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RISK BLINDNESS AMONG TEMPORARY MIGRANT WORKERS IN AUSTRALIA
ABSTRACT
Workers can suffer from risk blindness in that they fail to recognise workplace hazards or
their severity, thereby jeopardising their health and safety and their organisation’s performance. This
problem is exacerbated in organisations who employ temporary migrant workers because not only do
‘home country’ cultural factors influence the way they understand and see risks; more critically the
temporary nature of their work contract can reduce their commitment, and perceived responsibility, to
acknowledge risk. The result of which could expose temporary migrant and domestic workers to
increased incidents of work-related injury, disease and fatalities. This paper presents this problem
through the lens of institutional theory to explain uneven power differentials between temporary
migrant workers and managers that lead to risk blindness.

Key Words: Temporary migrant workers, risk blindness, temporary work contracts, hazard
identification, work health and safety.

At 31 January 2013, there were more than 125,000 people in Australia working on the 457
visa programme as temporary migrant workers. This was a 22.4% increase over the previous 12
months with 2011 and 2012 experiencing the largest jump in temporary migrant workers (DIAC,
2013). Many come from the Philippines, China and India which are countries with poor health and
safety records (Safe Work Australia, 2012a; b). While over the last two decades, there have been
advances across all sectors to improve health and safety performance in Australia, the impact of
increasing numbers of temporary migrant workers has yet to be manifested on the health and safety
record.
With a rise in the numbers of temporary migrant workers, especially from countries with poor
health and safety records, and the continuing use of these contracts to fill domestic skill shortages
(AWPA, 2012; DIAC, 2013), there is potential to erode any gains made in improving the work health
and safety (WHS) performance of Australian workplaces. This paper presents a short discussion on
the 457 visa, followed by a review of the extant literature to argue that research is needed to determine
the impact that migrant workers on temporary contracts may have on Australia’s work health and
safety performance. The hypothesis is made that temporary contracted workers in Australia may
suffer more from risk blindness than domestic workers. The problem is situated in terms of
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institutional theory to provide a theoretical framework underpinning a conceptual model to guide the
future research agenda.
THE TEMPORARY 457 VISA
The Temporary Business Long Stay Visa subclass 457 was introduced as Australian policy in
1996 (Oke, 2010). The temporary 457 visa allows firms to employ skilled migrants with skills that
appear on the Consolidated Skills List (after a genuine search for domestic workers) from 3 months to
4 years and provides visa holders with the opportunity to apply for permanent residency after two
years if sponsored by their employer.
The employment of workers on temporary 457 visas is strongly debated in Australia.
Supporters of skilled migration argue that in periods of rapid growth the Australian economy lacks the
capability to train sufficient domestic workers within the timeframe industry requires (OECD, 2002;
Roach Report, 2005; Evans, 2008). Supporters also argue that skills shortages increase the risk of
extending the construction phase of projects, which results in cost blow-outs and the subsequent
nervousness of overseas investors (BCA, 2012). In response to pressure by Australian business, the
Federal Labour Government relaxed migration policy in 2009 to allow increased skilled migration
numbers to create a ‘big Australia’ (ABC News, 2009) and rezoned WA to regional status to increase
numbers of skilled migrants applying for permanent residency (Bowen, 2012).
Opponents argue that employing overseas workers place Australian jobs at risk (Richards,
2006) and reduce domestic skills training (Hugo, 2006; Toner & Woolley, 2008), and that workers on
457 visas are at risk of exploitation through reduced wages, conditions and political and social rights1
(Oke, 2010; Jockel, 2009; Deegan, 2007; ILO, 2003).
THE RISK BLINDNESS PROBLEM
On average each year, over 250 Australian workers die from an injury sustained at work and
over 2,000 more die from a work-related illness (Safe Work Australia, 2011). Furthermore, in excess
1

Exploitation has occurred in the past through reduced wages, poorer conditions, and limitation of political and
social rights due to the temporary nature of their stay in Australia. These workers have no voting rights or means
to influence their working conditions (Jockel, 2009). However, increased protections for these workers’ rights
were included in the terms of employment in 2010 with a requirement to ensure these workers have parity of
working hours and remuneration with Australian workers.
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of 640,000 workers were injured at work in 2009/10. The estimated annual cost of compensation and
worker rehabilitation is around $57.5B, equivalent to nearly 6% of Australia’s Gross Domestic
Product (Safe Work Australia, 2012a). While Australia strives to be a world leader in health and
safety performance, and the new national work health and safety strategy (AWHSS) sets targets for
20% reduction in fatalities and 30% in work-related injuries across industry by 2022 (Safe Work
Australia, 2011), it is not clear that better health and safety performance will be reached. Risk
blindness is an impediment to achieving these targets.
The perception of risk is subjective and ‘a particular risk or hazard [means] different things to
different people in different contexts’ (Royal Society, 1992:7). Risk blindness arises from a cultural
bias whereby individuals ‘either cannot see it [risk] or consider it inherently acceptable’ (Frosdick,
1997: 172). Risk blindness is known to contribute to poorer health and safety performance (Bahn,
2012, 2013; Manuele, 2010) and is highlighted with the employment of temporary migrant workers.
This occurs first, as many migrant workers come from countries with health and safety records worse
than Australia’s (DIAC, 2013), and second, these migrants bring with them their cultural biases or
home country experiences (Vertovec, 2007) that shape how they perceive risk. Understanding risk
blindness among different groups of workers is important if Australia’s health and safety record is to
improve.
For this paper and the context of workplace health and safety, culture is defined as the
behaviours and beliefs that constitute ‘standards for deciding what is, standards for deciding what can
be, standards for deciding how one feels about it, standards for deciding what to do about it, and
standards for deciding how to go about doing it’ (Goodenough, 1971:21-22).
Migrant workers have been recognised as a group that has particular issues in terms of health
and safety performance. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2004:64) notes some of these
issues: ‘language and cultural barriers require specific OSH [occupational safety and health]
communication, instructions and training approaches; and many of these workers overwork and/or
suffer from poor general health and are therefore particularly prone to occupational injuries and workrelated diseases’. Health and safety studies have considered migrant workers’ voice (rights),
participation (obligations), knowledge transfer (values and understanding) and wellbeing (Sargeant,
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2013; Gravel, et al, 2013; Mori, Yoshikawa & Sakai, 2013; Reid, 2012). For example, Gravel, et al
(2013) found migrant workers in Quebec rarely participated in assessing risks or providing solutions
and this was compounded by their under-representation by unions, and they thereby lacked ‘voice’.
Sargeant (2013) found migrant workers undertook long working hours (often working two jobs) and
they were two times more likely to be injured than domestic workers. Reid (2012) found the
underutilisation of migrant workers’ skills led to mental health issues. In these studies there was an
over-representation of migrant workers in health and safety statistics and compensation claims data.
Research (Bahn, Yap & Barratt-Pugh, 2012; Bahn, Barratt-Pugh & Yap, 2012) has also shown the
need for support beyond settling a new migrant into a job, especially for migrant workers from
developing countries (Bahn & Barratt-Pugh, forthcoming). Clearly these studies signal the need for
health and safety support for migrant workers and identify issues around risk blindness. However, to
date, the national injury, death and disease statistics have yet to show the impact of the recently
increased numbers of workers on temporary visas because they lag behind by up to two years. We
don’t yet know whether these workers will be overly represented in future Australian health and
safety statistics and compensation claims data.
TEMPORARY CONTRACTS AND IMPACT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY
A temporary mode of employment can affect how workers engage with their work, their coworkers, their managers and supervisors and their employing organisation. There is a complex
interplay between ‘experiences, opportunities, constraints and trajectories’ (Vertovec, 2001;
2007:1049) that shape new migrants responses to their host country and their perceptions about
regulation in terms of rights and responsibilities. Temporary migrant workers lack voice, may not
understand their employment rights and are not served well by unions (Sargeant, 2013; Gravel et al,
2013), all of which affects their recognition of risk. Research that investigates risk blindness among
temporary migrant workers is yet to be conducted. This topic forms a basis for the future research
agenda of the author. However, in order to better understand the problem, institutional theory has
been drawn on as a theoretical framework to support the conceptual model developed in this paper.
The paper examines risk blindness among temporary migrant workers drawing on institutional theory
because it is useful in its recognition of the role of power, organisational structure and agency. This
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next section provides a brief overview of institutional theory underpinning the conceptual model that
follows.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK - POWER
Power plays a key role in determining organisational structure, practice and the way people
‘act and perform’ (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006:17). Individual actors have the power to
construct and reconstruct organisational rules, norms and beliefs (Barley, 1986) but are more likely to
conform to requirements imposed by others in an organisational position of power or authority
(Zucker, 1977). Power is therefore an integral part of determining a firm’s health and safety practice
and performance.
Institutional theory recognises the role of power. According to the early work of Selznick
(1957) he describes institutional theory as a social process of instilling value to an organisational
structure or process, with a common theme that social behaviour is mediated by rules and culture
(Scott, 2004). The theory notes the beliefs that influence actions or practice repeated over time that
become habitualised (Burger & Luckmann, 1967; Zucker, 1977), are independent of the actor’s
individual’s views to determine the “way things are to be done” (Scott, 1987:496), and are represented
as symbolic aspects of the organisation and the environment (Scott, 1987). These processes are an
integral component of the organisational culture (Strang, 1994). Process takes on a “rule-like” status
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977:341) that is regulated both internally and externally.
Internal regulation and codification is demonstrated in terms of written policy and procedures
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) to signal “good-faith compliance” and “due-process governance” (Sutton
Dobbin, Meyer & Scott, 1994:946), to influence the beliefs and behaviours of actors (Scott, 1987) and
to display to those outside of the organisation robustness in terms of health and safety management
and “are less likely to trigger audits by regulatory agencies” (Edelman, 1992:1542).
External influence occurs through formal regulation structures, such as health and safety
legislation, competition for commercial contracts and market position (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
where organisations are “rewarded for effective and efficient control of the work process” (Scott &
Meyer, 1983:140) with increased legitimacy and resources (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and inducements
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and sanctions by those further along the supply chain where evidence is sought to prove continuing
structural and procedural conformity (Scott, 1987).
However, Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that in order to achieve legitimacy and sanctioning
by others, organisations may construct stories about what they should be doing that do not necessarily
have any connection with what they actually did. Oliver (1991) suggested that organisations may not
always respond with passive conformance, but instead will engage with compromise, avoidance,
defiance and manipulation.
Institutional theory gives special emphasis to authority relationships that rely on legitimate
coercion (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Scott, 1987). Inducements and coercion are examples of power
and authority (Clegg, 1979; Clegg, et al, 2006; Dornbusch & Scott, 1975). In terms of improving
safety culture organisations rely on internal and external inducements and coercion, even though
social psychological scholars note that internal motivation and commitment is not reinforced by
external sanctions and rewards (Deci, 1971; Staw, Calder, Hess & Sandelands, 1980). However,
powerful actors are highly influential in determining organisational safety performance.
Zucker (1977) noted that actors are more likely to conform to requirements imposed by others
if the latter occupy a position of power or authority in the organisation. Clegg et al (2006:17) argued
that power and discourses are intermingled and constitute the political structure of organisations
through “diverse circuits of power”. They explain that to understand power we need to be aware of
the mechanisms organisational leaders use to perpetuate power and the structures of dominance that
they create and strive to make legitimate and embedded within the culture. Linking power and
institutional theory from this standpoint is extremely important in terms of safety performance,
improvement and change because this discipline is highly practical and is limited in its application of
theory to understand the underpinnings of process.
MODELLING INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND TEMPORARY MIGRANT WORKERS
The preceding has shown that power plays a key role in determining organisational practices
(Clegg et al, 2006). However, temporary migrant workers lack power (and voice). This lack of power
arising from the nature of their work contract can affect their belief of their responsibility to address
risk and their inaction can become habitualised. This is reinforced through poor supervision, a lack of
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cultural awareness (Sargeant, 2013), limited training to address risk blindness (Bahn, 2012; 2013),
and a lack of voice (Gravel, et al, 2013).
There is evidence that in Australia safety performance is highly important as is reflected with
the almost complete harmonisation of work health and safety legislation to provide a minimum
benchmark in terms of safety culture (SafeWork Australia, 2011). However, with the recent supply of
temporary migrant skilled labour to the resources sector making up 20% of the workforce in 2012
(DIAC, 2013) what we don’t know is the impact on that safety culture. Organisations are today more
likely to operate simultaneously in a number of institutional environments as evidenced by
multinational corporations (Westney, 1993) and employ global labour with possible conflicting
cultural, regulative and normative practices (Scott, 2004). As Scott (2004) noted, in modern
organisation’s boundaries are often blurred and allow alternative and divergent models of behaviour.
With large numbers of workers with conflicting values and beliefs, how do Australian
organisations remain compliant in terms of work health and safety? Will they adopt practices as
reported by Meyer and Rowan (1977) that conflict with what they show to the outside world and what
they actually do? With skilled labour in such short supply these actors have considerable power. Are
these actors able to undermine the safety performance of organisations in the firms’ attempts to
remain commercially viable and profitable? What role does normative (e.g. minimum safety
standards) and cultural-cognitive modes of influence (e.g. duty of care) or ‘soft power’ (Scott, 2004)
have in this context to encourage improved organisational safety performance? Institutional theory
that recognises the role of power, structure and agency is well positioned to make sense of the way
organisations negotiate these problems.
Tolbert and Zucker (1996:185) noted the need for “champions” to support the structures that
reflect the organisations values and beliefs and change processes for improvement to encourage
embedded practices or institutionalisation. In terms of health and safety ‘safety champions’ such as
those in leadership roles (managers and supervisors) play a crucial role in promoting robust
organisational safety performance. What do organisations employing large numbers of skilled
migrants need to have in place in terms of structures to maintain their current level of safety culture
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and to continually improve as required by health and safety legislation? What role does agency play?
Who are the influential actors – managers, co-workers or the migrant skilled worker?
Organisations practice internal regulation through policy and procedures (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978) and draw on external factors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) to generate desired behaviours (Scott,
1987). A model of health and safety performance that clearly shows the dynamics of managerial and
temporary migrant workers relationships in terms of power, structure and agency could go some way
to help make sense of the way organisations negotiate these problems. Figure 1 provides a model that
shows the factors that increase risk blindness in temporary migrant workers. The factors shown in the
model are unlikely to be the definitive list; however they go some way in defining the problem in
terms of risk blindness and temporary migrant workers.

Insert Figure 1 about here

The model depicts power relationships between the temporary migrant worker and their
managers and the external factors that regulate the organisation and require compliance. Structures are
shown in terms of working hours and temporariness of the employment contract. The factors affecting
agency appear as: the values, beliefs and attitudes about health and safety practices held by the
worker; the culture of the worker as well as the safety culture of the organisation; assimilation into the
organisation and into the Australian way of life; and the knowledge, skills, English language
proficiency and understanding by the worker in terms of hazard identification, that affect risk
blindness. Additional factors that lead to risk blindness in temporary migrant workers include: their
physical and emotional wellbeing; a lack of Union representation leading to an overall lack of voice;
fear of their contract ending suddenly requiring them to find another source of full time employment
or be deported within 28 days (DIAC, 2013); and the impact of their actions on their bid for
permanent residency. The next section unpacks the model and highlights areas that need further
applied research in industries that are high risk and high users of temporary migrant workers.
Temporary migrant workers enter Australian workplaces with their personal beliefs, values
and attitudes towards health and safety practices that sculpt their perceptions of what is safe and what
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is not. These values are shaped by the way work is carried out in the home country and impact on the
perceptions and performance of the worker. Many temporary migrant workers come from countries
with lower levels of health and safety performance and this difference affects the way that they view
and address risk in Australia. This is important because Sargeant (2013) argued that in research
conducted in the UK that migrant workers are twice more likely to be injured at work than domestic
workers. In Australia there is tension between the expectations of how workers are to manage safety
according to legislative requirements and how this plays out in the workplace. When you have
workers on temporary visas that come from countries with lower expectations and substandard work
practices they place themselves and their fellow workers at risk in their failure to recognise and
address workplace risks because they don’t see or acknowledge this risk.
The temporary nature of their contract exacerbates the value they place on addressing risk in
terms of their responsibility in that Australia is not their home country and they may not be working
here for very long (Vertovec, 2001). Given the short term nature of their contract it may be viewed
easier to keep quiet about any risk that arises. These workers may not perceive that addressing risk is
their problem; someone else can do it.
Temporary migrant workers may not have sufficient knowledge of hazards and risk in that
they may not have worked in a similar environment in their home country. This is compounded by
language skill inadequacy in that although they are required to have a minimum level of English
language proficiency this does not ensure that these workers fully understand health and safety
matters (Toner & Woolley, 2008). For example, being able to read the words ‘hydrochloric acid’ does
not ensure that the worker understands the seriousness of handling such a chemical.
Assimilation and cultural difference affects risk blindness in that the temporary migrant
worker may be trying to assimilate into the Australian way of life and may be fearful of raising issues
regarding risk in that this action may cause them to stand apart from their fellow workers (Sargeant,
2013). Furthermore, speaking out and questioning organisational practice may go against inherent
cultural practices (Asian workers, for example, view speaking out against their managers as a sign of
disrespect (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2007)). Cultural difference has a direct impact on risk blindness in that
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people from different cultures have differing perceptions of risk, the acceptable way hazards should
be managed and who has the responsibility to address workplace risk.
The fear of speaking out may be compounded when the worker takes up work in Australia as
a mechanism towards seeking permanent residency. Under the temporary 457 visa requirements,
workers can apply to become permanent residents after working in Australia for two years as long as
their employer is prepared to sponsor them. This requirement sets up an unbalanced power
relationship (Clegg, et al, 2006) in that the worker may be reluctant to question workplace practice
(Zucker, 1977) in fear of sabotaging their efforts to remain in Australia permanently. Research that
investigates this power relationship in terms on the effect on risk blindness is sorely needed. Do
temporary migrant workers accept substandard and unsafe practice for the first two years of their
contract? If so, how does this undermine Australia’s efforts to improve organisational health and
safety performance? Are they also placing themselves and their fellow workers at greater risk of
injury, death and disease through inaction, under reporting and turning a blind eye to risk?
Under the terms of the temporary visa workers are unlikely to be represented by a Union. Oke
(2010) and Jockel (2009) argued that due to the lack of union representation, workers on 457 visas in
Australia are at risk of exploitation through reduced wages, conditions and political and social rights.
Gravel, et al (2013) confirmed this argument and noted that migrant workers in Canada lacked voice.
Without Union representation even if workers on temporary visas had the courage to speak out, they
would lack collective support to ensure risk is adequately addressed by organisations.
Sargeant (2013) questioned the physical and emotional wellbeing of migrant workers in the
UK arguing that these workers often endured long working hours and many held down two or more
jobs. Long working hours can lead to fatigue which has been shown to significantly increase
workplace injury (Safetyline, 2006). Temporary migrant workers may be under considerable stress
that affects their wellbeing and has a direct impact on their level of risk blindness because they fail to
sufficiently engage in the workplace or the work they undertake.
Finally, organisations are regulated by health and safety legislation and are required to
comply and provide safe and healthy workplaces (Safe Work Australia, 2011). In terms of power
(Clegg, et al, 2006) external regulation has a pivotal role in the ensuring the protection of temporary
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migrant workers. However, in the case of temporary workers the precariousness of their employment
arrangement (Mayhew, 2005) means that ‘difficult’ workers or those that question work practices can
very quickly have their contract severed. This has two implications in terms of risk blindness. First,
hazards could be ignored and remain unrectified for fear of losing the temporary work contract and is
an example of legitimate coercion that encourages risk blindness (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Scott,
1987). Second, if an issue is raised, the temporary migrant worker may have their contract terminated
under the guise that their work is no longer needed and the hazard remains once again unaddressed.
This practice allows the organisation to keep hazardous practices behind closed doors all the while
continuing to be viewed positively by their customers and competitors (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Conversely, tipping the power differential on its head in the case of temporary migrant
workers we also see that power can shift in their favour. Migrant workers on temporary visas are often
employed because they have specialised skills that can’t be sourced in the domestic labour market.
Furthermore, firms employing highly skilled workers often pay considerable money to recruit a
worker from overseas (Bahn, Yap & Barratt-Pugh, 2012) and may not wish to lose these workers to
competitors. The balance of power may shift in these circumstances in that managers may be prepared
to overlook discrepancies and underperformance of these workers’ health and safety practices
accepting compromise (Oliver, 19911), thereby encouraging risk blindness. Research in this area
remains limited to the work of Mayhew and Quinlan on precarious work and health and safety
conducted in the last decade. Studies that investigate risk blindness, the management of risk and the
uneven power differential in terms of the temporary migrant worker and their manager is yet to be
done.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS
For Human Resource Managers, Health and Safety Managers and Supervisors there are
several implications and added responsibilities when employing migrant workers on temporary visas.
These workers often require additional support to settle into working and living in Australia (Bahn &
Barratt-Pugh, forthcoming). HR professionals should be aware of the additional time they will need to
spend to assist workers on temporary visas to find appropriate housing, establish bank accounts,
purchase vehicles and generally be made aware of Australian customs. Problems exist in that the
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added multicultural skills required by HR professionals to manage these workers may not be within
their existing skill sets.
Health and Safety professionals need to be aware that understanding risk and blindness to risk
is a skill required of all workers and those workers on temporary visas may need extra training and
mentoring to ensure they are keeping their fellow workers and themselves healthy and safe. Specific
training in hazard identification skills has been called for as a strategy to reduce risk blindness (Bahn,
2013).
Supervisors are the first line of management and their role as mentors is crucial in settling
sufficient standards to ensure workplace health and safety and the management of risk remains robust
in the organisation.
Finally, domestic workers play a role in leading by example, reporting unsafe practice and
generally looking out for their fellow workers, regardless of their employment conditions.

CONCLUSION
This paper introduced the prevalence of risk blindness among migrant workers on temporary
visas. Factors that contribute to risk blindness were modelled to determine a future research agenda on
this topic. These factors include: the power relationships between the temporary migrant worker and
their managers and the external factors that regulate the organisation and require compliance;
structures such as working hours and temporariness of the employment contract and workplace
culture; agency factors, for example, the workers values, beliefs and attitudes, culture, assimilation;
and the knowledge, skills and English language proficiency. Personal factors affecting temporary
migrant workers include: their physical and emotional wellbeing; a lack of Union representation
leading to an overall lack of voice; fear and the impact of their actions on their bid for permanent
residency. There is limited research that investigates the level of risk blindness and workers on
temporary migrant visas. We do not know whether they place themselves and their fellow workers at
greater risk of workplace injury, death and disease because of uneven power differentials and the
effect this has on their level of risk blindness and the management of hazards.
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Figure 1: Temporary migrant workers and factors that create risk blindness
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